Unserialization can result in code being loaded and executed due to * > object instantiation and autoloading, and a malicious user may be able * > to exploit this. * * The natural way to stop that from happening is to just refuse to unserialize * stuff by default. Which is what we're doing for anything that's not scalar. */ public static bool $safe_mode = true; /** * @psalm-var bool|class-string[] */ public static $allowed_classes = false; public function getTypes(): array { return ['string']; } public function getTriggers(): int { return Parser::TRIGGER_SUCCESS; } public function parseComplete(&$var, AbstractValue $v, int $trigger): AbstractValue { $trimmed = \rtrim($var); if ('N;' !== $trimmed && !\preg_match('/^(?:[COabis]:\\d+[:;]|d:\\d+(?:\\.\\d+);)/', $trimmed)) { return $v; } $options = ['allowed_classes' => self::$allowed_classes]; $c = $v->getContext(); $base = new BaseContext('unserialize('.$c->getName().')'); $base->depth = $c->getDepth() + 1; if (null !== ($ap = $c->getAccessPath())) { $base->access_path = 'unserialize('.$ap; if (true === self::$allowed_classes) { $base->access_path .= ')'; } else { $base->access_path .= ', '.\var_export($options, true).')'; } } if (self::$safe_mode && \in_array($trimmed[0], ['C', 'O', 'a'], true)) { $data = new UninitializedValue($base); $data->flags |= AbstractValue::FLAG_BLACKLIST; } else { // Suppress warnings on unserializeable variable $data = @\unserialize($trimmed, $options); if (false === $data && 'b:0;' !== \substr($trimmed, 0, 4)) { return $v; } $data = $this->getParser()->parse($data, $base); } $data->flags |= AbstractValue::FLAG_GENERATED; $v->addRepresentation(new ValueRepresentation('Serialized', $data), 0); return $v; } }